罗斯·特里尔 美国哈佛大学
Terrill, Ross, Harvard University
原文Original
How do Asian Marxist-Leninist systems replace a top leader? A dramatic example was that of Mao Zedong in the third decade of the PRC’s history. I will trace succession politics in Beijing 1974-78 and make some international comparisons especially with the current North Korea case. My analysis of Mao’s final years will suggest that succession in such a system displays a number of variables that should be taken into account:
- Sudden departure of the supreme leader as against a more protracted departure.
- The length of time the ruler has been in office (one year? fifty years?) and the length of time that the regime he heads has existed.
- Do recent failures by the departing leader provide a springboard for a would-be successor to gain power by coming up with a fresh policy line?
- Whether or not a strong family role exists in succession plans and struggles surrounding the ailing leader.
- A system with a military that is intrusive in politics handles a succession period differently from a system where the military is not intrusive.
- The effect of physical and/or mental decline on the capacity of an ageing ruler, and on access to him as that affects succession politics.
- The likely existence of a gap between the personal concerns of the sinking leader and the wider concerns of those maneuvering to take over the reins from him.
- The degree to which differences in political philosophy may be found among factions bidding to provide the new leader.
- Foreign pressures and expectations can be a factor playing upon succession politics in a smaller country.
- The option of an interim replacement may exist, with implications of such a choice for the ultimate succession after an interval.
- Strong emerging forces may disguise their moves and initiate a process of differentiated stages in order to win the fundamental succession.
- Is there ambivalence on the part of the dying leader as to whether he considers anyone worthy to replace him?
In Pyongyang, it is certain that smart people have studied various succession crises in Beijing, Moscow, Havana and other Marxist-Leninist capitals as Kim Jong-il faces his final phase. The succession question is urgent not only in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, but also in the political, military, and intellectual circles of South Korea, as well as in the neighboring countries of China, Japan, and Russia. Mao‘s last years offer clues to the Pyongyang situation that are summed up in the variables I have set out.
Of course, for all the reports of Kim Jong-il’s weak condition in 2009, it cannot be ruled out that he will live for quite a few more years. Had Mao died in 1956 he would have been succeeded by Liu Shaoqi; had he died in 1970 the new leader would have been Lin Biao. It is also a major factor that Pyongyang today is much more opaque, even to Seoul scholars and diplomats, than Beijing was to the non-Chinese world in the 1970s.
译文Translation
亚洲马克思—列宁主义体制中的继任政治：中国1970年代之经验与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国21世纪情况之比较
在亚洲马克思列宁主义制度下，最高领导人的更替是如何实现的？中华人民共和国建国20多年时，毛泽东的继任问题是一个引人注目的例子。本人将回顾1974—1978年北京的继任政治，并与当下北朝鲜的情形进行一些比较。
本人对毛泽东在任的最后几年的分析表明，在这种体制下的继任呈现出诸多变数，应该引起重视：
* 最高领导人的突然离世与拖延了更长时间的离世之对比。
* 领导人在任时间的长短(1年？还是50年？)以及他所领导的政权的存在时间。
* 将离任领导人的政策失误是否为想要继任的人提供一个跳板，使其可以通过新政策来获得权力？
* 在选择继任者时和围绕着患病领袖所进行的权利斗争中，领导人的家庭成员是否起到了重要作用？
* 有无军方插手的体制在处理权力交替时会采取不同的方式。
* 年迈领导人身体和/或精神状况的衰退对其个人能力和其是否可接近所造成的影响。
* 即将卸任的领导人与其他可能继任的接班人在所关注的问题上可能存在差异。
* 各派系努力为新领导人提供的政治哲学之差异程度。
* 国外压力和期望可能会影响一个小国家的继任政治。
* 过渡性代任也可能存在，暗示着在短暂过渡后将选出最终继任者。
* 强大的新兴力量可能暗地行动，并分阶段赢得最终的继任权。
* 临终的领导人是否对他认为能够接替他的人怀有一种矛盾心理？
在金正日执政的最后阶段，平壤的睿智人士已经研究了北京、莫斯科、哈瓦那和其他马克思列宁主义首都的各种继任风波。继任问题不仅是朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的紧要问题，还是韩国及相邻的中国、日本和俄罗斯等国的政治、军事和知识界所迫切关注的问题。根据上文归纳的诸种变数，毛泽东最后几年的情况为平壤现在的状况提供了一些启示。
当然，尽管2009年所有的报导都显示金正日身体虚弱，这并不能排除他还能活很多年的情况。如果毛泽东在1956年去世，刘少奇就会继任；如果他1970年去世，那时的新领导人会是林彪。此外，不能忽视的是，即使在汉城的学者和外交官眼中，今日的平壤要比1970年代的北京更难以捉摸。