成中英 美国夏威夷大学
Cheng, Chungying, University of Hawaii
原文Original
Mutual Interpretation as a Process of Converging Identification of the True
In this article I shall deal with two sorts of important problems of translation and interpretation in sinological or comparative philosophical studies: One sort of problem is to do with the nature of appropriation of meaning of one system from the another system known a geyi (格义), and the other sort of problem is to do with the death of the author approach to multiplication of interpretation of a text. The first sort of problem raises the question: How and why geyi is needed and evaluated? The second sort of problem raises the question: Is any interpretation as good as the other among all free interpretations, say for example, of the Lunyu or Confucius?
I shall start with the first sort of the problem. In 3rd to 4th Century Chinese Buddhist scholars used Daoist terminology and language to translate the Indian Buddhist Sutras in Sanskrit. This is known as geyi, a matter of identifying meanings in a text. In my onto-hermeneutics it is a typical case of “interpretation from one’s own sense of identity in terms of one’s own resources of understanding（自本体的诠释）” which consists in determining the referents of the Indian concepts through an implicit system of Daoist meaning determinations rooted in Daoist experience. This process helps the Indian texts to finally achieve an autonomy of meaning in reference to an ontology of nothingness again rooted in real life experience and rituals of Indian Buddhists. These Chinese translations cannot be exactly equivalent to their original Indian meanings but can be considered as development of these original meanings in a new vehicle by way of mind-relating language symbols to references as mediated by projected or imagined experience which are again open to interpretation and hence to other insightful presentation or articulation.
It is in this fashion we can see how《大乘起信论》(written in around middle of 5th Century) is written as a new interpretation of the enlightened mind or the mind of Buddha nature. In this interpretation the Buddha state of total enlightenment is given meaning which is dynamical and dialectical: the world is both seen as samsara and yet as transparent as sunyata. When we come to Hui Neng’s Platform Sutra, the distinction between 悟 and 迷 is made and the world is transformed in terms of the wu and mi of mind. Now if we ask whether Indian Buddhism could recognize this development, the answer is that they may recognize or accept this development of ideas of mind and nature as deeply related to their notion of Buddhahood and yet they may also reject this development as deviation from the original Indian view of enlightenment in the Four Noble Truths. Whether to accept or reject obviously depends on a criterion of recognition and acceptance to be formulated. It would be a question-begging to even ask whether we use the Indian or the Chinese perspective. Yet we have to see a subtle point of requirement for comprehension: under such comprehension Indian Buddhism could be accepted as a stage of its development into the non-Indian Buddhism which naturally becomes Chinese Buddhism from a Chinese Buddhist view. What is important is the standpoint of the Chinese Buddhists in explaining the transformation.
The question has been asked how Indian Buddhists would translate Daoist and Confucian texts in the 4th Century. They have to use their language and experience as resources in order to capture the meaning of Daoist texts such as DDJ. The same process of interpretation from one’s own resources needs to be recognized. Their interpretation could lead to a new brand of Daoism or Confucianism invested in Indian or Buddhist system of experience, reference, rituals and forms of understanding. The question can be asked whether this interpretation would illuminate or clarify the meaning of the Daoist and Confucian texts. Not necessarily, what would be achieved is how Indian Buddhists could understand the Chinese Tradition in terms of their own tradition. What is important is the existence of an Indian Standpoint with its own need and ability to make interpretation of the Daoist texts. This would be equally true of the Daoists or those Chinese Buddhists to use their own resources such as Daoist system of understanding to make sense of the Buddhist texts.
Assuming this process of mutual interpretation continues for a long period of time in which each subsuming or appropriation of the other’s meanings would lead to a larger horizon of understanding, one comes to see what would be the common ground or common areas of life experience between the two, and yet one would come to see at the same time where, how and even why each differs. In this picture of mutual understanding one sees how one may reach the ultimate limit where difference and differentiation have to be recognized as necessary and requisite if two different forms of life and speaking are to be allowed.
In this process of mutual interpretation one may ask whether between two different ways of interpretation one must be better or superior in some sense than the other. The answer is negative as the question is actually a question on which side one language feels the need of understanding the other side. It may be true that one side may have a system of understanding which is more complex or subtle in making conceptual distinctions and or in making explicit explanations in terms of structures and definitions. One would use this one side for explication and construction of an understanding which is missing in the other side and yet which can be said to be rooted in the basic forms of understanding of itself. For example, the Chinese Daoists could share with the Indian Yogacara Buddhist their understanding of sense organs but not necessarily with their understanding of the roots of the sense organs. By the same token, we have to introduce this conception of sense root (shigen 识根) for a more explicit or complete understanding of sense perception and consciousness. But we must also recognize that a Neo-Confucian theory of mind and nature in human person may not have to depend on such Buddhist notions for their coherence of meaning and relevance of reference.
In this connection we can see that we have two systems of understanding of human consciousness and human mind: the Indian Chinese Buddhist theory of eight consciousness and the Chinese Neo-Confucian theory of mind and nature inclusive of human will and emotion. There is no reductionism on the Neo-Confucian side when we speak of the zhuzai (主宰) in terms of the woshi (我识). There is positive account of enlightenment in li instead of enlightenment in sunyata. They exist side by side and each may help the other to identify some important latent feature and each can be used by the other for comparative or contrastive purpose in order to understand oneself better or fuller so that one may develop oneself better and fuller.
Thus we come to one important conclusion that there is just one form of geyi: geyi is to be understood as understanding of one system by another for one reason or the other. It can be a reciprocal process or one way process and each process would generate a system of understanding to be used or adopted for identification or for reference. It is required as a method or exercise to assess and understand the other system in terms of one’s own understanding for the purpose of understanding the other. It is a process of interpretation for the purpose of giving experiential meaning to new terms of the other system. It is an also a process of realizing the other system as a system so that eventually the other system may become autonomous in self-generation of meanings in terms of their own vocabulary and statements in reference to experience and human imagination or abstraction. It is like to breathe in a life breath so that the other system could become alive and operating as an autonomous interpreter. What is interpreted becomes capable of interpreting and self-refining and self-defining. It may even become capable of feeding back to the original interpreter (Daoism or Confucianism) so that more distinction could be made in the original interpretation. We have here a matter of “interpretation toward establishing and understanding identity of the other (对本体的诠释)”. But the whole process of mutual understanding becomes thus an from-interpretation to towards-interpretation and vice versa between two systems of language or ideas which results in mutual interpretation and mutual understanding. In this sense there is no such thing as the so-called nigeyi (逆格义)other than using one external system of meaning for clarifying the meanings of one’s own internal system. There is simply a two way interpretation or geyi between the two systems.
In this junction I do wish to point out that we do wish to recognize the subjectivity and its purposiveness of one system in interpreting the other system. If understanding is initiated for the purpose of understanding the other system in light of my system we may have the geyi in the original sense. But if we need to use other system to help understand our own system, we may indeed speak of nigeyi as using the other system to clarify or enrich our own system. But we must nevertheless recognize that nigeyi is still a matter of geyi which requires that we have mastered the meaningful resources of the other system so that we may use it to clarify my own system for the purpose of enlarging and developing my own system. In my view, if we do not have these two conditions satisfied we should and we cannot speak of the nigeyi. If we miss the first condition, how do we use the other system to interpret our own system at all? On the other hand, if we do not have the motivation and purposefulness for achieving better understanding and eventually the will to develop our own system, why do we need some system to interpret us which we may not understand or find useful in the first place? Suppose an ET comes to read and render our system into their ET system, it is just their own keyi activity. It is not a geyi for us nor a nigeyi for us.
In light of the above we may characterize the process of mutual understanding or mutual interpretation as a matter of two way other- interpretation (towards-interpretation) for the purpose of self-interpretation (from-interpretation), which would have to meet the following conditions:
1. We find that we understand the other system in some important aspect of details of distinction and reference based on human experience and we find that they are useful for our own self-understanding;
2. We want our own system to be equally articulate and explicit about certain distinctions in our own language and we find that we may do so by introducing those distinctions into our own language and thus redefining our own language which can be seen or made to be seen to contain a similar distinction implicitly. Such would be the case where we see how certain forms of Chinese grammar and logical rules are reconstructed;
3. We are interested in refining our system as a vehicle of articulation in reference to human experience as a whole so that we can enlarge our scope of reference and precise our forms of inference;
4. In this process we shall also become aware of some foundational and core assumptions which are deeply rooted in our experiences of reality and being which cannot be explained in other system without being explained away. In this manner we come to make a distinction between the logical and attributive difference of things and the ontological and cosmological difference in our experiences of things of the world in our system or for that matter in those of the other system;
5. We may allow diverse axiomatic systems with their pre-understanding of foundational premises without denying that they could share a large area of experiences which can be clarified by concepts or terms of one system or the other;
6. We may allow those mutually explanatory or clarifying terms as logical and scientific in nature in a system which we may learn and subsume in our own system for our purpose;
7. Even metaphysical terms and concepts of other system could be studied and learned for purpose of self-understanding or self-interpretation of our own metaphysical terms and concepts. For example, we can learn as much theology of God and agape in Christianity so that we can learn better our own daology of the dao in Daoism or renology of ren in Confucianism;
8. The ultimate state of such mutual interpretation is to develop a network of mutual understanding of overlapping consensus among a plurality of ontologies with their own onto-hermeneutics which can always interpret others for clarifying and enriching either the other or oneself or both;
9. The world of human understanding would consist of such mutual understanding and interpretation which enable us to grow and develop to differentiate and to integrate; and there is no end to this process of mutual growth and mutual development;
10. The good thing about this is that we are able to care for others as we care for ourselves and to let others to care for us as they care for themselves on the premises that we could share our common experience and our common experiences of differences and thus come to appreciate each other as ultimate sources of meaning for the purpose of creation of our identities in being.
11. Here we come to see a circle of onto-hermeneutical understanding in mutual reinforcement and mutual self-generation which makes creative action possible, and which would lead us to realize a harmony of differences based on different self-generating systems of meaning and valuing which are related not only by understanding but by actions for diversity of forms of life.
Next, we come to face the problem of plurality of interpretation of the same system from the other systems or even one system. The concrete case for this problem is the existence of different interpretations of Confucius on the basis of his Analects. Is Confucius a lost aristocrat who languishes and argue for certain class values of the lost landlords? Or is Confucian an aspiring bureaucrat who wishes to restore the bureaucracy of rituals of the West Zhou? Is Confucian a discriminator of the labor in favor of rule by mind? Is he an implicit discriminator of women with obscure understanding of the feminine sex and subtle mistrust and contempt for them? When we come to the so-called postmodern interpretations of Confucian Analects and Confucius, all these questions can be raised and asked and there are always critics and defenders of a given position. It appears that there is no way to settle such questions nor is there a need to really settle such questions.
Given this postmodern approach based on the death of the author thesis, it is however still necessary to point out that for all these positions there is indubitable assumption that Confucian ideas are important and influential and Confucius is important and influential because of his ideas and his ideas based on his ideas. There is furthermore the assumption that the Confucian ideas are important and potentially influential for our future, but not only for a past of ours. What the postmodern critics want to do is simple: they want to warn us against such influence and see it as harmful for us human beings and therefore wish to deconstruct the Confucian ideas and destroy one image of Confucius for the sake of making place for another. The interesting strategy is to appeal to the fact that there is no positive evidence that one image must be the case. But they may also forget that there is no necessary evidence to the contrary. There is even argument or suggestion that there is no such a person called Confucius and Confucius is simply a construct in the minds of the Jesuits or in the mind of a modern Westerner through translation of some Confucian text. This may indeed lead to a multiplication of Confucian images, beginning from the Pre-Qin period and down to the present day through Han, Tang, Song, Ming and Qing and in different persons from the ruler to the common people in different classes and in different sexes.
On the other hand, the defenders want the Confucian image and influences recognized on the basis of official document such as the Historical Records of Sima Qian and other historical documentation. They specifically want to stress the formation of our Confucian image in terms of his main ideas, not some vague or ambiguous statements which could lead to condemnation or accusation of him a moral sage. They want to see Confucius as a humanist who can be counted on humanizing the modern world for the benefit of all.
I do not see any solution or settlement of opinions into one way or another. Those who oppose Confucius may always see Confucius as discriminating against women even if it is pointed out that the statement on nuezi and xiaoren are interpreted as referring to something harmless. To be more subtle, if there is some patronizing attitude on the part of Confucius with regard to the status of woman dan xiaoren, one still can see that Confucius did not exhibit any attitude in mistreating women and there is no reason to suspect that Confucius as he is may not treat a woman with equal ren and respect and trust her abilities to become a minister or general of the government. Hence the crucial thing to do in order to escape from such postmodern arguments is to distinguish what is important and what is not in our understanding of the ideas of Confucius and /or what is important and what is not in our understanding of the actions of Confucius as a person. It is also to see whether we can really understand the Confucian idea of ren (humanity) and make use of them. To promote Confucian philosophy of ren is certainly not to promote anti-feminism nor to promote discrimination of labor nor to promote something against our essential interests as a human being. If the problems lies in understanding Confucius as a teacher or as a traveler in his time, we trust history will tell us more when we know about him through more discovered texts and findings. There is no great need to draw quick conclusion on what Confucius is from one sentence or two from a single book called Analects.
In saying this I am not against a pluralist and even conflictual interpretation of Confucius and Confucianism, but we have to substantiate our arguments on holistic grounds and evaluate them in terms of what inspirations we can get from him or what values and ideals we may draw from him. There are already different aspects of Confucian practices some of which are democratic and some of which are non-democracy. Again my suggestion is that we should get to the bottom of the matter in terms of what kind of basic moral philosophy and cosmology he can be said to truly value and believe. On these latter grounds one can easily see why one could accept Confucius for his ideas of ren and other virtues such as yi, li, zhi, and xin which we ourselves could appreciate in terms of our need for humanity and harmony of the world.
译文Translation
双向诠释与义理的深化与广化：跨文化与跨哲学的理解如何可能
本文将讨论汉学与比较哲学中有关翻译与诠释的两类重要问题：一类问题被称为格义，即探索意义从一个系统被借用到另一个系统后的本质。第二类问题涉及到作者之死所引出的对一个文本的多重阐释。第一类问题让我们思考：为什么需要“格义”？当如何评价“格义”？第二类问题在询问：在众多关于《论语》或孔子的自由阐释中，是否有高下优劣之分？
我将从第一类问题谈起。三、四世纪的中国佛教学者运用道家术语翻译印度梵文佛经，这被称为“格义”，即要在文本中辩识意义。在我的本体诠释学中，这是“自本体诠释”（利用自己的理解资源从自我身份意义出发阐释）的一个典型案例——通过一种根植在道家经验中的含蓄的道家意义系统来决定印度概念的中文对应词语。借鉴“虚无”这一植根于印度佛教徒实际生活经验和教仪的本体论概念，这一翻译过程最终帮助印度文本获得了意义的独立（autonomy of meaning）。这些汉语译文同梵文原义并不精确对等，而是通过一种新的手段来发展原文意义，通过关乎心灵的语言象征传递被想象的经验，而这些象征有待阐释并期待其他有见地的表述。
我们可以看到，正是凭借这种模式，《大乘起信论》才对菩提心（enlightened mind或mind of Buddha nature）作出了全新解释的。在这种解释中，佛陀彻悟的状态被赋与了动态而辩证的意义：世界既是轮回的（samsara），也是空的（sunyata）。我们看到在慧能的《坛经》中迷与悟被区分开来，世界则因迷心与悟心而转变。如果我们质疑印度佛教是否能认可这种发展？答案是，他们可能会认可或接受这一心、性观念上的发展，因为这些与他们的佛性概念有深刻的关联；但由于这种发展偏离了印度佛教四真谛（Four Noble Truth）中原初的顿悟观，他们也可能会拒斥这种发展。显然，接受还是拒斥这种发展取决于认知和接受的标准。追问我们究竟采用印度视角还是中国视角可能也是在用未经证明的假定来辩论。但是，要理解这些需要我们看到微妙的一点：在这种理解之中，人们可以从印度佛教向非印度佛教发展阶段的角度来接受印度佛教。在中国佛教徒看来，印度佛教自然而然地变为了中国佛教。中国佛教徒在解释这种转变时采取何种立场变得很重要。
有人曾经问过四世纪的印度佛教徒会如何翻译儒家和道家经典。为了把握《道德经》等道家文本的含义，他们也只能利用自己的语言和经验资源。我们应该看到，这同样是从自身资源出发来阐释的过程。他们的阐释也会导致在印度或佛教经验、文献、仪式和理解模式系统中诞生一个儒家或道家的新支派。人们或许会问，这种阐释能否把儒道文本的意义说清楚、讲明白？不一定。但是，这种阐释体现了印度佛教徒如何从自身传统去理解中国传统。更为重要的是，我们明白存在一种根据自身的需要和能力解释道家文本的印度诠释观。同样，中国道家和佛教信徒也会利用自身的资源（如道家的理解系统）去格定佛教文本的意义。
假设这一双向诠释的过程持续了很长一段时期，双方各自消化和借用对方的意义会引出一个更宽广的理解视域。这时人们会看到双方的共同点和共同的生活经验；但同时也会看到，双方在何处、何时甚至为了何故而彼此不同。在这种双向理解中，人们将明白人类如何可能抵达最终的极限。如果人类要允许两种不同的生活方式及言说形式共存，就必须认识到这种差异和区别是必然而且必要的。
在这一双向诠释的过程中，人们或许会问，在两种不同的诠释方式中，是否必定有一种方式在某种意义上优于、或高于另一种？答案是否定的，因为这个问题实际上是在问，究竟是哪一方语言觉得需要去理解对方。确实，涉及到结构和概念，一方在区分或详尽阐释概念时或许有比另一方更为复杂和精微的理解系统。人们会利用较为复杂的这一方来阐明并构建出另一方所缺失的理解，但这种理解还是植根于其自身基本的理解形式中。例如，中国道家会同印度佛教瑜伽行者分享他们对感觉器官的理解，却不一定认同他们对感觉器官之根源的理解。同样，我们必须引入“识根”(sense root)这一概念才能更清楚或全面地理解人的感知和意识。但我们还须承认，新儒家有关个体的心性理论并不一定要依托上述的佛教概念才能获得意义的一致性和说明的关联性。
就此而论，我们可以看到两套理解人类意识和心灵的系统：印中两国佛教的“八识理论”（eight consciousness），以及中国新儒家含纳了人类意志和情感的“心性理论”。当我们谈及新儒家一方的“主宰”概念时，会发现它并没有简化“我识”概念。新儒家肯定了“理”中的顿悟而不是“空”中的顿悟。两套系统并立，每一方都能协助另一方去辨识出某些重要的潜在特征；为了比较或对照，每一方都能被另一方利用，以期能更好、更完整地理解自身，从而更好、更完整地发展自身。
于是，我们得到一个重要结论，即“格义”只有一种模式：“格义”就是一个系统出于某种理由通过另一个系统获得理解。这一过程可以双向，也可以单向，但每个过程都会生成一个理解系统，用来辨读文义或参考。在一方为了理解另一方而生成了自己的理解之时，为了评估和理解另一系统，“格义”是一个基本方法和必要练习。“格义”是一个阐释过程，赋予另一个系统中的新术语经验性的意义。“格义”还是让另一个系统成为一个系统的过程，这样另一系统最终可以变成自主生成意义的系统，生成自己的词汇以及与人类经验、想象和抽象有关的语句。这个过程就像生命中的呼吸过程，另一系统可以成活并成为一个独立的诠释者。被诠释的内容因而能够去诠释、去自我改进和自我定义。它甚至能够回应最初的诠释者（道家或儒家），使原初的诠释更突出。这里我们有一个“对本体诠释”的问题（为了建立和理解他者的身份而做的诠释）。但是整个双向理解的过程因此变成两种语言和思想系统之间相互的“自本体的诠释”到“对本体的诠释”过程，并最终成为双向诠释和双向理解。从这个意义上来看并不存在所谓的“逆格义”，只有为了辨明某一系统自身内在系统的意义而运用一种外来意义系统的“格义”。简单地说，两个系统中存在一种双向诠释或者“格义”。
文至此际，笔者希望指出的一点是，我们确实希望在一个系统诠释另一系统时能认识到其主体性及目的性。如果理解最初是为了根据自身系统来理解另一个系统，我们或许有原初意义上的“格义”。但是，如果我们需要使用另一个系统来帮助我们理解我们自己的系统，我们也许真的可以谈谈“逆格义”，将之当做通过另一个系统来辨明或丰富我们自己系统的过程。但是无论如何，我们必须认识到“逆格义”仍然是一种“格义”，需要在我们掌握另一系统的意义资源之后才能用之来辨明我们自己的系统，来扩大并发展我们自己的系统。依笔者之见，如果我们并没有这两个让我们满意的条件，我们不应该、也不能谈“逆格义”。如果我们没有第一个条件，我们如何能运用另一系统来诠释我们自己的系统？另一方面，如果我们没有更好理解并发展我们自己系统的意愿，我们何必需要某种系统来诠释我们可能不理解或者发现无用的系统？假设一个外星人来阅读并把我们的系统译为外星人系统，这只是他们自己的“格义”活动，不是为我们而作的“格义”，也不是为我们而作的“逆格义”。
参照上文，我们也许可以将双向理解或双向诠释过程描述为双向他者诠释（对本体诠释）过程，其目的是为了自我诠释（自本体诠释）。这需要满足下列条件：
首先，我们发现，可以通过人类经验中的特征与参照之重要细节来理解另一系统，而且我们也发现，这些细节有助于我们的自我理解。
其次，我们希望自己的系统能用我们自己的语言同样清晰明了地表述某些特征，而且我们发现，将这些特性引入我们自己的语言，并因此重新定义我们自己的语言后，我们可以做到这点。这样我们自己的语言就可以暗含类似的特征。从某些汉语语法形式和逻辑规则的建构中我们可以看见这种情形。
第三，我们乐意将我们的系统改进为某种表述人类整体经验的工具，这样我们就能够扩大我们的参照范围并使我们的推论形式更精确。
第四，在这个过程中，我们也应注意某些基本核心假说，这些假说深深植根于我们对现实和存在的体验中，如果不加解释，这些假说在另一个系统中无法被理解。由此，我们要区分事物的逻辑和属性差异，以及我们自己系统中我们所体验之事物的本体和宇宙性差异。这对于另一个系统中的事物也是一样。
第五，我们不妨承认各种自明系统以及他们对一些基本假设的前理解，而不需否认这些假设有着大量的共同体验，而且各种系统的观念或术语可以阐明这些体验。
第六，我们不妨承认那些在一个系统中双向解释或阐明的术语本质上是有逻辑和科学的，而且为了我们自己的目的，我们可以学习这些术语并将它们包容进我们自己的系统。
第七，为了理解或阐释我们自己系统的形而上学术语和概念，我们甚至可以学习并研究其他系统的形而上学术语或概念。例如，我们也可以学习基督教的上帝与爱之神学，这样我们就能更好地认识道教中的“道学”或儒教中的“仁学”。
第八，这种相互阐释的最终状态是为了在多元本体论中发展含有双方共识的相互理解网络。每一方都有自己的本体诠释，总是能够为了辨明和丰富他者、自我或者双方来解释其他系统。
第九，人类理解的世界将由这种双向理解和双向诠释组成，这会帮助我们成长和发展，既区分又融合；同时，这种相互促进和相互发展的过程没有止境。
第十，这样的好处在于，我们能像关心自己那样关心他人，并让他人像关心他们自己一样关心我们。这样做的前提是我们可以分享我们的共同体验和我们对差异的共同体验，并由此彼此欣赏，为了创造我们当下的存在身份将对方视为意义的最终来源。
十一，在此，我们可以看到一种在相互增强与相互自我更新上的本体诠释理解循环。这种循环使得创造行为成为可能，并能使我们认识到这些差异的统一。这些差异来自不同的意义与价值的自我更新系统，而这些系统通过理解和多样的生命形式及活动彼此相连。
接下来，我们面对同一系统内部或者从其他系统而来的多元诠释问题。这个问题有一个很具体的例子：在孔子的《论语》基础上有着不同的对孔子的诠释。孔子是一名为了没落奴隶主的阶级利益而抑郁寡欢并为之据理力争的没落贵族吗？他是一名希望恢复西周礼仪制度的有抱负的政客么？孔子歧视劳动并支持劳心者统治吗？孔子是否委婉地歧视了妇女？是否用对女性的模糊理解来表述了他不信任和轻视妇女？在用所谓的后现代方法诠释《论语》和孔子时，都会涉及这些问题，而且总是有持某个立场的评论家和辩护者。这些问题似乎无法解决，也没有必要去彻底解决这些问题。
如果这种后现代方法是基于作者之死理论，依然有必要指出，所有这些立场都有一个毋庸置疑的假设，即孔子的思想和他本人都很重要且富有影响力。此外，还有一个假定：孔子的思想对我们的过去和未来都很重要并有潜在的影响力。后现代评论家们想做的很简单：他们想提醒我们警惕这种影响力，认为它对我们人类有害，因此，他们想解构孔子的思想，并为了树立孔子的其他形象而摧毁孔子的这种形象。这种新奇策略是诉诸这一事实：没有确定无疑的证据表明那一种形象就必然如此。然而，他们可能也忘了，也没有明确的证据表明情况不是那样。甚至有这样的观点或想法，即没有这个叫做孔子的人，孔子只是耶稣会士们头脑中建立的形象；或者，只是通过翻译孔子的某些文本而在现代西方人头脑中建立的形象。先秦以降，时至今日，经过汉、唐、宋、明和清，并经过从统治者到不同阶层和不同性别的民众的阐释，的确可能产生诸多孔子形象。
另一方面，辩护者们依据官方文献（譬如司马迁的《史记》和其他历史文献）想让孔子的形象和影响得到认可。他们尤其想强调，他们是根据孔子的主要思想在心中形成孔子形象，而非依据某些含混或模糊的观点，因为这些观点导致道德圣人孔子遭到谴责或非难。他们想把孔子视为人道主义者，认为可以依靠孔子使现代世界更人性化并能造福苍生百姓。
无论如何，我没有看到任何解决办法或解决意见。那些反对孔子的人可能始终会认为孔子歧视妇女，即便我们已指出，关于“女人”和“小人”的说法应理解为指某种无害的东西。更确切地说，倘若孔子对妇女和小人地位的态度有点颐指气使，那么，我们同样可以看到，孔子没有流露任何虐待妇女的态度。我们没有理由不相信孔子本人不会同样以“仁”对待妇女，会尊敬并相信妇女有成为朝臣和将军的能力。因此，要甩开这类后现代观点的关键是，在我们理解孔子的思想时分清什么重要、什么不重要；在我们理解孔子这个人的行为时，也要分清什么重要、什么不重要。此外，这还取决于我们是否能真正理解孔子的“仁”（人性）的思想并运用这种思想。无疑，发扬孔子的“仁”学不是去鼓动反女性主义、歧视劳动，也不是去宣扬与人类根本利益相违背的思想。倘若问题在于将孔子理解为他那个时代的教师或云游者，我们相信，在我们通过更多文字或实物发现而更加了解孔子后，历史会告诉我们更多。没有必要仅仅根据《论语》中的只言片语就对孔子其人草率地下结论。
我这样说，并不是要反对那些针对孔子和儒教的多元诠释，乃至矛盾诠释，但是，我们必须在整全的立场上证明我们的观点，并根据我们能从孔子身上得到的启发或从他身上找到的价值和理念来评价这些观点。儒家实践已经有很多不同的方面，有些是民主的，有些是不民主的。我的观点依然是，如果要追根究底，我们应该搞清到底什么是孔子可能谈论过并确信具有价值的基本道德哲学和宇宙观。由此，我们很容易发现我们认同孔子的原因是，他关于“仁”的思想和其倡导的诸多德性，譬如“义”、“礼”、“知”和“信”等，都是我们从自身人性和世界和谐的需要而赞同的东西。